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LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION. By Daniel
A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 159. Cloth $34.95; paper, $13.95.

During the 1980s, concerned scientists warned that global warming would cause irreparable environmental damage unless the world
community took immediate and massive corrective action. 1 Despite
such dire predictions, U.S. policy has reflected the views of other,
more cautious experts.2 Recent administrations have refused to initiate government action to prevent global warming until scientists develop consistent conclusions through continued study of the problem.
Advocates of this approach assert that while global warming might
have severe environmental consequences, a hasty overreaction to the
threat could have even higher costs to society. 3
•
In Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction, Professors
Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey4 advocate a similar "wait and
see" response to public choice theory, a scholarly movement with
equally troubling implications. Public choice theory is "the application of economics to political science." 5 George Mason University's
James M. Buchanan received the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics for
his pioneering work in the area. 6 Buchanan's Nobel Prize increased
the awareness of public choice theory among legal scholars. Consequently, since 1986, public choice scholarship has exploded within the
legal community, 7 raising a host of questions about the efficacy of
1. See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1988, at Al [hereinafter Shabecoff, Global Warming]; Philip Shabecoff, The Heat Is On
- Calculating the Cansequences ofa Warmer Planet Earth, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1988, § 4, at 1.
See generally MICHAEL OPPENHEIMER & ROBERT H. BOYLE, DEAD HEAT (1990) (providing an
overview of the global warming problem).
2. See Shabecoff, Global Warming. "SUpra note 1. Note that scientists still debate the expected
magnitude of the greenhouse effect today. See Bob Davis, In Rio, They're Eyeing Greenhouse
Two-Step, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1992, at Al ("[W]hether temperatures will rise that much and
when are the subject of brawls at scientific conferences.").
3. See Philip Shabecoff, Bush Asks Cautious Response to Threat of Global Warming, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1990, at Al; see also OPPENHEIMER & BOYLE, supra note 1, at 62.
4. Professors Farber and Frickey both teach at the University of Minnesota Law School.
Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction draws heavily on three previous collaborative
articles by the authors. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and
Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1013 (1988); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence ofPublic Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1987); Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988).
5. P. 7 (quoting DENNIS c. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 1 (1989)).
6. Buchanan coauthored perhaps the seminal work in the field, JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CoNSENT (1962). See Robert D. Tollison, Public
Choice and Legislation, 14 VA. L. REv. 339, 340-41 (1988).
7. See, e.g. Symposium on the Theory ofPublic Choice, 14 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988). It is not
surprising that legal scholars, especially those with a law and economics bent, have pursued
public choice with a vengeance. In a recent article, Professor Robert Ellickson suggested that
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American government. 8
The book's subtitle - A Critical Introduction - accurately portrays what Farber and Frickey intend to accomplish. In a format accessible to readers unfamiliar with the intricacies of political economy,
the book concisely introduces the two major strands of public choice
theory. 9 At the same time, it critically assesses the theory and the
applications of the theory to public law proposed by the existing scholarship. The authors reject the claim that the results of preliminary
public choice research justify making dramatic shifts in government
policy. Instead, they argue that if continued inquiry confirms the preliminary :findings, public choice theory might, in time, lead to some
promising applications {p. 6).

I.

PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY

As developed in Chapter One, the first and foremost tenet of public
choice theory challenges the traditional assumption that government
operates in the public interest. Instead, public choice theory views the
policymaking process as a battlefield where legislators, bureaucrats,
interest groups, and individual voters compete to maximize their own
private interests.
A common method of public choice analysis is to hold constant the
behavior of three of these competing groups and then to consider the
incentives influencing the remaining group's maneuvers. For example,
some public choice scholars have focused on welfare maximization of
legislators by holding the behavior of the other political actors constant. Farber and Frickey recognize that politicians need to raise
money and remain popular to keep their jobs and thus accept the public choice argument that the pursuit of reelection exerts a strong influence on legislative decisionmaking {p. 24).
A legislator may stay popular by providing two distinct services to
her constituents (p. 22). First, she can tailor her voting behavior to
the wishes of the majority of her constituents. 10 Similarly, she can
introduce legislation to protect and promote her constituents' general
interests. Second, she can act as a liaison between individual constituents and federal agencies. She- or more correctly her staff-might,
for example, intervene with the Social Security Administration to assist a constituent in receiving his check.
law and economics research has begun to reach a point of diminishing returns. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and
Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 26 (1989).
8. The authors might have put this recent history in perspective by including a brief discussion of the historical development of public choice theory. Tollison, supra note 6, at 339-41,
includes such a discussion.
9. In fact, a reader with a strong background in political economy or in legal process might
not find the book very useful. The authors did not address the book to this audience.
10. More precisely, she can vote in a way that will maximize her expected number of votes.
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Underlying this view of the behavior of legislators is the assumption that constituents will perceive continuation of these services to be
in their own economic interest and will rationally respond by voting
accordingly. However, Farber and Frickey assert that actual voting
behavior is not entirely consistent with tliis assumption and that voters
do not always act rationally in their own self-interest. In fact, truly
rational self-interested citizens would not vote at all because voting is
costly and, according to the authors, produces no visible benefits (p.
26). It poses a free-rider problem (p. 24), and, after all, no election is
ever decided by a single vote. The authors propose instead that civic
duty motivates citizens to vote (p. 27).
Note, though, that two arguments support the view, dismissed by
the authors, that voting is consistent with the rational self-interest
model. First, as stated by Professor Dwight R. Lee,
[P]eople receive satisfaction from participating in processes they feel are
important, from supporting things they believe are good, and from opposing things they believe are bad. People are motivated to go to the
polls and vote for much the same reason they are motivated to go to the
sports arena and cheer. 11

Second, even if one accepts the authors' view that ideology plays a role
in voting (p. 27), one can argue that voting based on ideology is consistent with public choice. As Professor Lee suggests, voting provides
constituents with a cheap way to express their preferences. 12 Voters
will express their preference based on their knowledge about a candidate, which can be extremely limited. Consequently, they will vote for
a candidate based on ideology and demeanor, which serve as readily
discernible signals predicting how the candidate will act if elected.
In addition to or in lieu of serving her constituents, our legislator
may also maintain her popularity through political advertising and
promotion. Such activities, and the political consultants engaged to
coordinate them, do not come cheap. Thus, legislators feel compelled
to raise a great deal of money and at the same time avoid negative
publicity. Special interest groups can provide legislators with money
and with publicity (both good and bad). Consequently, public choice
scholars ascribe great power to these groups.
Farber and Frickey do not subscribe to the dominant public choice
view that the power of interest groups necessarily results in inefficient
political outcomes out of sync with the public interest. Rather, they
adopt a more cautious view that rent-seeking by interest groups poses
a potential problem (pp. 33-37). Rent-seeking occurs when an interest
group pursues an outcome which is economically beneficial to it but
11. Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191,
193 (1988).
12. Id. at 194-95.
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will result in a net cost to society as a whole. I3 A classic example of
rent-seeking by special interest groups occurs when domestic producers seek trade protection from foreign goods. I4 Such protection is
economically inefficient because the costs incurred by consumers and
others as a result of the protection exceed the economic gains to the
domestic producers. Is In addition, the costly rent-seeking behavior itself generally serves no useful function. I6
Farber and Frickey question the public choice premise that rentseeking is necessarily undesirable because it is inefficient (p. 34). They
argue that an economically efficient outcome is not necessarily socially
desirable. For example, equity concerns might conflict with efficiency.
Accordingly, the authors believe that "rent-seeking can be justified
when it advances other social values."I 7
Farber and Frickey omit significant discussion of the public choice
view of bureaucracy. Under this view, as advanced by George Stigler
and others, bureaucrats build empires, maximize budgets, and take actions that protect their receipt of lucrative post-government employment. Is With the rise of the regulatory state, bureaucrats play an
increasingly important role in developing and interpreting our public
law. Consequently, even in the context of a concise introduction, Farber and Frickey's failure to include some discussion of the relationship
between public choice and the bureaucracy weakens their work.
As we have seen, the first strand of public choice theory, the battlefield model, suggests that political outcomes may reflect private rather
than public interests. In Chapter Two, the authors develop a second
strand of public choice theory known as Arrow's Theorem, which suggests that political outcomes may not reflect dominant political preferences at all. Instead, political outcomes may be distorted by strategic
behavior and the filtering of combinations of voter preferences through
agenda-setting rules (pp. 38-40). As a result, outcomes may seem in13. Note that only some legislation is influenced by rent-seeking. If the cost of influence is
greater than the perceived benefit, the interest group will not act. The degree to which rentseeking pervades the legislative process is unclear. The authors take the position that "in
presuming that statutes are normally the result of self-serving influence, the rent-seeking model is
too cynical about the legislative process." P. 68.
14. ROBERT J. BARRO, MACROECONOMICS 530-31 (1984).
15. Id.
16. Special interest groups, however, may lower the cost to the legislator of gathering information upon which to base their legislative decisions. The interest groups presumably have an
incentive to tell legislators at least partial truths in order to avoid discrediting themselves and
losing any chance of influencing future legislation.
17. P. 35; see also Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and ''Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199, 226 (1988).
18. See, e.g.• DWIGHT R. LEE, FISCAL POLLUTION AND THE CASE FOR CoNGRESSIONAL
TERM LIMITS 7 (Center for the Study of American Business Contemporary Issue Series No. 51,
1992) (discussing role of bureaucracy in promoting the growth of government spending); George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971).
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coherent. Farber and Frickey do a superb job of clearly communicating the intuition behind this complex material.
Notwithstanding the incoherence that Arrow's Theorem predicts
for a democracy, American government exhibits some degree of both
coherence and stability. The authors conclude, therefore, that classic
republicanism creates a countervailing influence on our political system. They assert that, "[a]s compared with public choice, republicanism views the role of government as far more creative. Rather than
mechanically processing preferences, government involves an intellectual search for the morally correct answer" (p. 44). Farber and
Frickey seem to believe that neither public choice theory nor classic
republicanism offers a complete description of the political process.
Nevertheless, they conclude that several features of the political system's structure limit the incidence of the behavior predicted by Arrow's Theorem. For example, our strong two-party system facilitates
preference accumulation through coalition building (p. 49). In addition, the separation of powers promotes stability. Ultimately, the authors reject the Arrovian view of democracy as a black box intended to
produce strict majority rule. In sum, they state, "a viable democracy
requires that preferences be shaped by public discourse and processed
by political institutions so that meaningful decisions can emerge.
Given this richer understanding of democracy, Arrow's theory holds
fewer terrors" (pp. 61-62).

II.

APPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC CHOICE

The second part of Law and Public Choice applies public choice
theory both to identify defects in the American political system and to
develop solutions to them. In Chapters Three and Four, Farber and
Frickey discuss and largely reject sweeping reform proposals suggested by public choice scholars. Chapter Three responds to an argument made by Professor Richard Epstein and others that public choice
theory provides persuasive justification for a return to active judicial
review of federal and state economic regulation. Inherent in Epstein's
argument is the public choice belief that government regulation cannot
be presumed to further the public interest. Consequently, where a
court can identify rent-seeking regulation, which by definition is economically harmful, it should strike down the regulation in order to
protect the public interest (p. 67).
Farber and Frickey reject the revival of vigorous judicial review of
economic regulation on three primary grounds. First, they find fault
with the idea that rent-seeking behavior by interest groups is so pervasive and successful as to dictate political outcomes (p. 68). The authors believe that (1) rent-seeking occurs only where the cost of
influence is less than the benefit, and (2) the cost to the interest group
of exerting countermajoritarian influence increases as the cost to the
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legislator of ignoring voter preferences increases. 19 Consequently, in
many situations, voter preferences rather than interest group preferences (as advanced through rent-seeking behavior) will predominate.
As an example, the authors cite recent deregulation of several major
industries as inconsistent with a pure rent-seeking model. In each episode of deregulation, the interests of diffuse consumers in increased
competition prevailed over the special interests of the regulatory monopolists (p. 68).
A second problem is that this form of judicial review is potentially
overbroad, reaching "legislation involving tariffs, defense contracts,
public work projects, direct subsidies, [and] government loans" (p.
68). It would require substantive review of virtually all regulation and
force the judiciary to function as a superlegislature. "[I]f taken seriously, [such review] would require much broader judicial review than
even the Lochner Court ever contemplated" (p. 68).
Finally, Farber and Frickey argue that facilitating economic efficiency is not the only legitimate goal of government (p. 69). Government may also promote societal values such as "environmentalism,
racial equality, [and] redistribution of income" (p. 69). Consequently,
the authors suggest that effectuating other public values may justify
inefficient legislation produced by rent-seeking behavior.
Chapter Four addresses the extent to which judges should rely on
legislative history to interpret statutes. Traditionally, legislative history has been viewed as reflecting the intent of the enacting legislature.
Public choice rejects the exis.tence of such coherent intent. Justice
Scalia and Judge Easterbrook argue that legislative history should play
a very limited role in statutory interpretation. In most cases, they believe the language of the statute alone should control its interpretation
(p. 90).
The authors concede that statutory language should often control,
but they disagree with Scalia and Easterbrook's premise that courts
should generally disregard legislative history (p. 102). They argue that
sometimes one can divine a coherent legislative intent underlying a
statute. In these instances, judges may find such intent useful in
resolving statutory ambiguities. Farber and Frickey also reject the opposite extreme exemplified by judicial opinions that appear to treat
committee reports (often prepared by youthful congressional staff
members) as meriting the same weight of authority as the statutory
language itself (pp. 98, 102).
The remainder of the book describes Farber and Frickey's views
19. The cost of ignoring voter preferences increases when the voters perceive legislation as
important. For example, voters may have difficulty perceiving the importance of small changes
in the tax code, and such changes are very susceptible to special interest group maneuvering. In
contrast, a special interest group is less likely to prevail in areas where voter interest and understanding are high.
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on the proper application of public choice to public law and identifies
some modest reforms that could be implemented immediately. Finding that "what we do know about the legislative process is that ideology, economic interest, and legislative structures all play roles," but
that "their relative importance is unclear and probably quite variable"
(p. 116), Farber and Frickey are unwilling to embrace any theory
which posits a consistently dominant role for any one of these elements. Instead, like many of the public choice theorists themselves, 20
they seek to employ the stabilizing aspects of public choice theory to
facilitate the political system's ability to formulate responsive public
policy (p. 117).
The authors want courts to enforce "structural and procedural
constraints on those aspects of the democratic process that public
choice suggests are most vulnerable to malfunction" (p. 117). To
achieve this goal, Chapter Five suggests first that Congress should restrict the power of special interest groups by limiting campaign expenditures (p. 132) and strengthening political parties (p. 135).
Second, courts should police delegation of legal authority to special
interest groups (p. 136).
Finally, when interpreting the meaning of a statute, courts should
use public choice theory to assist in determining the proper scope of
legislative intent (p. 142). For example, public choice could help identify the likely institutional influences present at the time a statute was
enacted. In tum, this could enable the court to determine whether the
legislature considered a particular issue at that time or failed to because the parties affected lacked representation.
CONCLUSION

Law and Public Choice presents a thoughtful introduction to public choice theory. The reader will take away an understanding of most
of public choice's major theoretical underpinnings. The second part of
the book, in which the authors discuss how public law might incorporate the insights of public choice theory, is equally accessible. Public
choice holds great promise for understanding and perfecting the polit20. See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case
for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179 (1988). Professors Brennan and Buchanan argue that
critics have gone too far in criticizing public choice's results and that further academic inquiry
should not focus on extreme results but rather on "the nonnative exercise of investigating the
incentive structures embodied in various institutional forms." Id. at 180. Rather than embracing the view that economic motives dominate political actors, public choice theorists, according
to Brennan and Buchanan, reject the view that "political agents can be satisfactorily modeled as
motivated solely to promote the 'public interest,' somehow conceived." Id. at 181. For an example of a critic who attacks public choice theory by setting up such a straw man, see Abner J.
Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on The Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988).
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ical process; however, Farber and Frickey make perfectly clear that we
have a great deal to learn before drastic action is warranted.

-

William Dubinsky

